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Abstract 
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future will be decided in East-Central Europe, we focus – using a questionnaire – on bank customers 
perceptions of bank governance and practice in the Polish-German city of Zgorzelec-Görlitz The 
experience of Dresdner Bank is stressed and the fact that the local people not long before lived under 
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      Transferring Rhineland Capitalism to the Polish-
German Border:  Perceptions of bank governance and             
practice in Zgorzelec-Görlitz 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The historical contexts in which banks operate have much to do with management’s goal setting and with 
outcomes attained.  Nowhere has this been truer than in the East German city of Görlitz during the fifteen 
years to 2005.  The region has not only suffered depopulation and massive unemployment (estimated at 25 
percent in 2005), which severely limited a local bank’s scope of action, but as the region emerged from 
Communism the banks had to operate within a German banking system that was in crisis.  The local 
manager of Görlitz’s Dresdner Bank, Herr Jan Lehmann, when he took up his job in November 2004 had to 
clarify his management options within this context.  He quickly concluded that the economic doldrums on 
the German side of the border left him little alternative other than to expand his customer base by enticing 
Poles to cross over the border to his bank (Interview June.06.05). By June 2005, he had managed to attract 
between 80 to 100 Polish customers who opened a bank account in his branch. These were low risk, 
transaction oriented customers who could clearly help to achieve his financial performance goals and set 
him up in a “winning” trajectory for a promotion in 2009.  Herr Lehmann was relatively young at 28 years 
of age and Dresdner Bank was his first and only job. He had been employed there for the last ten years after 
getting his high-school equivalent diploma and progressed internally. 
To clarify his strategy Herr Lehmann  invited a team of academic researchers to conducta survey of Polish 
and German clients, actual and potential, on both sides of the border.  The team accepted this task but 
broadened the focus beyond Dresdner Bank to Görlitz’s retail banking problems in general.  Beyond 
reading into banking case studies, banking literature, and doing interviews of local people, the team’s 
inquiry is based on a questionnaire circulated in the region in June and July 2005.  This article presents the 
team’s findings.  Before considering the results of the local inquiry, however, something needs to be said 
about Central Europe’s banking environment.  The remarks will be limited to the economy and the banking 
systems in which bank managers and their customers had to operate.  Both shaped the local inquiry, 
including the drafting of the questionnaire and its content. 
2  The Economy 
Since the entry into force of the Second Banking Directive on 1 January 1993, some areas of the Euro zone 
have been strong economically while others have been weak; this had an obviously effected bank 
performance.  A good example of how a prosperous European environment favored a bank occurred in 
Ireland at the Allied Irish Bank (AIB).  Over a quarter century the Irish economy grew rapidly, in 1983 as  
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much as 15 percent per annum, “a figure far in excess of EEC and US figures” (Harrington and Lawton, 
2003).    AIB, formed out of several small Irish banks in 1966, expanded with this prosperity, branching out 
internationally into the UK (1970), the US (1983) and Poland (1995).  Despite incurring great losses 
through a rogue trader’s transactions carried out in its US subsidiary (Allied Bank – created in 1997) with a 
loss of 789 million Euros in February 2002 (which aroused suspicions of poor management control in the 
parent firm), the bank consistently, within the dynamic economic environment, showed strong return on 
equity (ROE).  Between 1997 and 2001, the group’s ROE averaged 23.8 percent, earnings per share (EPS) 
19.6 percent, and Dividend Growth 18.1 percent.  Despite the fraud at Allied Bank, profits increased 8 
percent  and overall group profits 10 percent.  Management seemed to be able to do no wrong.  
By contrast the Hypo Vereinsbank  (HVB) in Germany, which united two of the largest German retail 
banks in 1998, had great difficulty operating in Germany’s stagnant economy.  Despite management’s high 
hopes that the amalgamation could produce synergies of efficiency and higher profitability that would 
improve bank performance in the depressed economic environment (Kelly et al., 2000), the results were 
more than disappointing. See Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary of financial performance of HVB Group, 2000-2004 
 
  2000  2001  2002  2002  2003  2004 
      New  Old     
ROE after tax excluding amortization & 
goodwill  
9.2  6.5  (2.8)  (2.3)  2.1  4.9 
ROE after tax   8.5  4.9  (5.4)  (4.4)  (19.7)  (17.6) 
Cost/Income ratio (operational revenue)  62.6  68.4  72.0  69.1  63.0  65.6 
Cost/Income ratio (profits from ordinary 
activities) 
61.8  68.0  73.9  70.4  97.4  68.7 
Total assets (bn euro)  716.5  728.6  535.8  691.2  479.5  467.4 
Total volume of lending (bn euro)  449.2  503.1  375.8  487.9  338.3  324.6 
Shareholders equity (bn euro)  19.6  25.1  11.3  14.2  10.3  11.5 
Share price (euro)  60.30  34.32  -  15.22  17.62  16.7 
Core capital ratio ( percent)  5.4  6.0  5.1  5.6  5.9  6.6 
Source: Annual report and accounts, 2004 
 
Hypo Vereinsbank’s performance mirrored those of all commercial German banks, including Dresdner 
Bank, in a lackluster German economy (Koetter et al., 2004).  Dresdner Bank tried several strategies to 
increase profitability before and after Allianz AG acquired it in 2001 and made the banking arm part of a 
bank-assurance company.  It restructured in order, as one study put it, “to insure efficiency and to generate 
growth.” (Danner et al., 2005) But “the trend displayed by the bank’s financial figures consistently shows 
that with the general economic downturn income went down and costs went up.” (Danner et al., 2005). 
This led to losses  (see Table 2).   
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Table 2: Summary of financial performance of Dresdner Bank Group, 2000-2004 
 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
ROE after tax excluding 
amortization & goodwill 
24.0%  9.6%  2.0%  -14.1%  3.1% 
ROE after tax   15.1%  1.3%  -6.6%  -15.4%  0.8% 
Cost/income ratio  77.0%  89.2%  101.2%  88.2%  85.1% 
Total assets (bn euro)  483.4  506.6  413.4  477.0  523.9 
Total volume of lending (bn 
euro) 
225.3  219.2  123.0  102.0  94.8 
Shareholders equity (bn euro)  13.0  21.6  11.9  11.5  11.0 
Share price (euro)  46.3  42.2*  51.1**  n/a  n/a 
Core capital ratio ( percent)  6.3  5.5  6.0  6.6  6.6 
Number of employees (thou)  45.1  45.7  39.7  34.9  30.1 
* = Take over announced. ** = Last trading price. Source: Annual report  (2004) and Danner et al. (2005).  
The  fall of Communism had not helped matters.  Average incomes in former Communist Central Europe 
only amounted to one-quarter of those of Western Europe.  Most people were poor by EU standards, and 
even for those with money to spare, the idea of entrusting it to a bank was quite foreign.  Borrowing less 
developed, bank loans to the private sector amount to 33 percent of GDP in Central Europe, against 91 
percent in the Euro-zone.  The banks were expanding into a backward area.  In any event German 
commercial banks could not rely on retail banking to improve income streams, for this sector is largely in 
the hands of savings banks (Sparkasse) and regional banks (Landesbanken) in Germany.  In 2004 
commercial banks only had 20 percent of the retail banking business in Germany (Dresdner Bank’s share 
was just 4 percent).   
Moreover, the banking sector in the former East Germany suffered from a credit crunch following initial 
post-unification massive investments in real estate.  Rents collapsed because of depopulation that left 
twenty-five percent of the building in the new German states empty of tenants.  Owners, without rent 
incomes, walked away from their loans and the banks suffered from a credit crisis. From 2000 to 2003 
there were lots of bad loans in Germany; Dresdner Bank during the period, to improve its balance sheet, 
sold off 200,000 euro worth of bad loan on the credit market for 100,000, thereby sacrificing fifty percent 
of their value in the transactions.  Since loans produced zero profits, management encouraged their people 
to sell other products.  But the Germany bank only sold 2 services per customer (in Görlitz it was 1.8) 
compared to five in the United States and the United Kingdom (Lehmann interview, 5.06.05). In our 
interviews with Lehmann, he stressed the lack of opportunity on the German side of the border.  Small 
wonder, then, with the population and the economy growing on the Polish side and unemployment ten 
point (16 percent) less than on the German , that Lehmann looked across the Neisse to expand his customer 
base.  
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3  The Banking System   
3.1  The Rhenish Model 
Second to the general economic context is that formed by the ownership and management under which 
banks in Germany operate.  We are use to looking at this East-Central Europe context in Cold War terms.  
The Post1945 division produced radically different situations in Communist East and Capitalist West – a 
division that has been particularly painful to Germans, running right through their country as well as 
through the heart of Europe.  There was the socialist east with state ownership and management through a 
command bureaucratic structure; there was the capitalist West with privately owned firms each managed by 
entrepreneurs and private management structures.  Along side this famous split exited another that is less 
known but which produced a quite significant clash of contexts inside the capitalist West. The French 
businessman Michel Albert in his influential book Capitalism against Capitalism (Albert 1993) used the 
nomenclatures of Rhenish or Rhineland capitalism vs the Atlantic or Anglo-American capitalist system to 
identify them.  In other words, East Germany may have been a communist state cut off from West 
Germany but West Germany has also been separated with its Rhenish Model of capitalism from the Anglo-
American dominant Atlantic capitalist system.   This distinction is significant because it manifests itself 
everywhere in an economy, including of course in banking at the macro (i.e. organizational) and micro- 
(i.e.  retail bank branch) level. In order to clarify how the models express themselves in banking, we need to 
look at how each defines the nature of the private firm with regard to governance and its relationship with 
the outside world. 
The Rhenish Model conceives of the firm as an Entity (An Entity Conception of the firm). The concept has 
affinities with biology for the firm is thought of almost as a living organism, composed of parts that are 
each vital to the firm’s existence.  The firm’s purpose is to grow, to prosper and to do everything necessary 
to nurture the parts essential to its existence.  The components of the firm are the capitalist owners (the 
individual capitalist or family proprietors in the small firms, the stockholders in the large publicly traded 
corporation), the employees, who collectively constitute the firm’s know-how and skills and as such are as 
integral a part of the firm as the capitalist who fund it, and the firm’s clients or customers who pay for the 
services and products that the firm generates.  Two points need to be stressed in this entity idea.   
One is that the employees have, as stakeholders, a legal right to participate, along with the owners, i.e., 
stockholders, in the firm’s governance.  In English we call this “employee participation,” in German 
Mitbestimmung (co-determination).  The idea of employee participation is rooted in 19th century German 
industrialization.  It gained respectability in the Second Empire, when Emperor Wilhelm II, in a reformist 
mood, incorporated it into a speech in 1890, asking for the creation of worker-representative bodies within 
factories that would defend employee interests in negotiations with employers.  The resulting Law for the 
Protection of Labor granted the workers joint consultation rights (Mitberatungsrecht) on social matters.  
This was not co-determination (Mitbestimmung) but the law authorized the organization of plant  
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committees in all factories covered by the Industrial Code of 1869, if they had more than 20 employees.  It 
required management to issue and abide by shop regulations spelling out relations with workers. 
As Germany fell to pieces in the chaos of defeat in 1918, employee participation in management took a big 
step forward.  In the revolution month of November 1918, employers, fearing Bolshevism, capitulated 
almost entirely to unions pressures, and their associations signed collective agreements which gave 
employees rights of co-determination with management in social policy and the right to be consulted in 
personnel and economic decision-making.  The following July (1919) a socialist-liberal-progressive 
majority in the Constituent Assembly wrote co-determination into the Weimar Constitution: Article 165 
called for “the equal participation of blue- and white-collar workers (Arbeiter and Angestellte) in the 
economic development of production forces.  The Third Reich revoked the rights granted, but defeat in 
1945 brought renewed efforts to enshrine co-determination into West German management   Shortly after 
the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Legislature passed the Co-Determination Law for the 
Iron and Steel Industry (1951) and then the following year, a Works Constitution Act.  This legislation did 
not give employees full rights of co-determination with owners, but, as strengthened in the legislation of 
1976, it did offer them, if not parity, at least extensive rights of co-determination in the governance of a 
firm.  This short history is stressed because it shows that Rhenish capitalism has depth in Germany. 
The second point in the Rhenish model has to do with the firm’s relationships with its customers and/or 
clients.  Perhaps the word client is more a propos in the Rhenish capitalist context.  While the word 
“consumer” is better suited to mass-consumer marketing, client describes a person who has a long-term 
relationship with a firm, one that the firm has particularly nurtured.  The Germans have a “kingly 
merchant” (koeniglicher Kaufmann) tradition whose credo is that success depends on the excellence of a 
firm’s reputation rather than slick advertising, and that trust rather than persuasion defines the relationship 
between the firm and its clients (Buchenau, Tools of Progress.)  
The “Atlantic or Anglo-American” model of capitalism is based on a proprietary conception of the firm.  
Accordingly, whereas in the “entity” concept, the business enterprise is a body which is separated and 
distinct from those who provide its funds, in this proprietary view, it is not   (Moores and Steadman, 1986).  
The capitalists in fact not only own the firm but they are co-extensive with the firm.  The employees are, 
therefore, just a resource, like raw materials, that the firm uses to make money.  For the proprietors, the 
firm is a Geldfabrik, a money making machine which operates to maximize return on the stockholders’ or 
the owners’ investment, in the form of profits, dividends and/or from added value that accrues to 
stockholders when the firm’s stock performs well on equity markets.  The great difference between the 
proprietary model and the entity model is that in the entity model the employees are legally empowered to 
participate in the firm’s governance. The proprietary model excluded employees from the firm’s 
governance which is the exclusive right of the owners, i.e., stockholders who select the management. The 
large proprietary firm of the Atlantic Model also differs from that of the Entity firm in its relationship to the 
outside world. Operating in large markets, American management created the mass consumer society,  
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which is based less on trust than on persuasion: marketing, advertising, and product merchandizing 
gimmicks. 
Banks like all large firms in Germany live within the Rhenish model.  They have co-determination built 
into their forms of governance, through employee representation on a bank’s Supervisory Board 
(Aufsichtsrat) which select the firms Managing Board (Vorstand) in their two-tiered board management 
system.   A bank’s works council (Betriebsrat), that is elected by its employees, also has co-determination 
rights in employee training and other social matters and rights to be consulted by the managing board in 
economic matters.   German banks are famous, too, for operating within the “kingly merchant” tradition.  
Small German firms usually have long-standing relationships with a Hausbank.  Large German firms 
traditionally relied on big banks for their financial needs.  The bank’s officers, to cement prolonged 
relationships, sat on the Supervisory Boards of their client firms and the Hausbank  held client company 
stock.   
By contrast, since Anglo-American firms use equity markets for money needs, banks in their system are 
less involved in corporate finance.  Firms utilize stockbrokers and public relations firms to float stock and 
bond issues.  They often expand through merges and acquisitions and unfriendly takeovers, rather than 
through reinvestment of profits or from money borrowed from banks.  Finally, Anglo-American banks like 
other firms operating in a mass consumer society’s large markets, have come to base their marketing of 
services and products less on trust than on persuasion, i.e., on marketing, advertising, and product 
merchandizing gimmicks.  
3.2  The Rhenish System in Crisis 
For decades while the Rhenish and the Anglo-American forms of capitalism co-existed and flourished, the 
distinctions between them did not mean very much.   The Americans prospered and West Germany 
developed the strongest economy and the richest society in Europe.  But in the late 1970s and 1980s, when 
Corporate Japan challenged the Anglo-American Model, it came under attack.  The immense literature on 
the subject, which is mostly forgotten today, singled out, in particular, how an “organic” conception of the 
firm, as opposed to an (American) “mechanistic” concept, led to better work processes, to quality products 
and better marketing, and how a system of Hausbank finance, as opposed to equity finance, permitted 
management to take a healthy long-term view of its business rather than to be hobbled by the short-term 
perspectives that under the Anglo-American system went with management’s need to keep stock values 
high in order to satisfy investors (Locke, 1996). The Japanese chiefly drew praise but so did Germany’s 
Rhineland model.  Now, fifteen years after the Collapse of the Communist block, after a time of 
unrelenting globalization, this discussion of Anglo-American capitalism’s deficiencies seems decidedly 
passé.  In fact the arguments are now reversed.  The advocates of the Atlantic capitalist system are 
assaulting the Rhenish model (and the Japanese).    
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The source of this attack is two-fold.  First, it stems from America’s leadership in the Information 
Revolution.  That sprang from the information technologies that the U.S. developed to fight the Cold War.  
Only the U.S. had the financial capacity, the commitment, and the global reach to support sustained 
development of the new Information technologies.  This support gave them leadership.  It arose, too, from 
peculiarities in the commercialization of this defense induced Information technology.  The 
commercialization did not happen as much through huge Fortune 500 companies through a high-
technology start-up culture that was especially dynamic in America (e.g. in Silicon Valley)  (Locke and 
Schoene, 2004).  The second source of this attack on the Rhineland model stems from the globalization of 
finance, manufacturing, and services which the Information Revolution, through the Internet, encourages 
and which the collapse of communism favored.  The new technologies allowed investors everywhere to 
trade in equity markets, twenty-four hours a day and for the flow of monies to increase dramatically, and it 
also let firms move to low-wage skilled and unskilled labor markets. 
3.3  “The Kingly Merchant Tradition” 
Within this new environment, the kingly merchant tradition in banking suffered, for Anglo-American 
capitalism proved to be better suited than the Rhenish Model to the Information Revolution.  Atlantic 
Capitalism fostered angel and venture capital networks that provided funds for start-ups and the creation of  
initial public offerings (IPO) on equity markets (such as NASDAQ) when the start-up firms arrived at the 
stage in their growth to go public.  Anglo-American Capitalism’s modes of finance, because rooted in 
equity markets, facilitated mergers and acquisitions, debt management, and capital acquisition generated on 
the expanding global stock markets.  Although German banks counseled their clients in the “kingly 
merchant tradition” on business matters, they began, following the Anglo-American banks, to market new 
products and services.  These included different loan packages, credit cards, insurance, and electronic 
banking through automated teller machines (ATM) and on-line services.  The biggest shift in their banking 
practice came when the Commercial banks, above all Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, in order to 
establish a reputation as security traders and business consultants in the new international environment, 
increasingly disengaged themselves from Hausbank functions in German industry.  Fewer bank executives 
by the turn of the 21
st century sat on the Supervisory Boards of large German concerns.  Whereas, for 
instance, in 1974 private German bankers occupied over 20 percent of the supervisory board seats in the 
100 largest German companies, in 1993 this percentage dropped to a mere 6.3 percent (Lütz, 2000).   Banks 
acted less as Hausbanken for large companies and held less of their clients stock in their portfolios.   
To overcome a lack of experience even in their home markets German banks sought to import Anglo-
American expertise.  German commercial banks joined a move by other European banks (like that made 
earlier in the in the UK by Barclays Bank and Midland Bank) and developed investment banking activities 
by acquisition rather than internally. Deutsche Bank, for one, turned to the UK and the US to recruit staff 
well versed in the ways of capital markets and it bought Morgan Grenfeld, the UK merchant bank, in 1989 
and Bankers Trust, the US specialist in hedge funds, in 1999.  Dresdner Bank acquired UK-based  
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Kleinwort Benson in 1995 and US-based Wasserstein Parella in 2000, attempting to expand into the global 
big league of underwriting, sales and trading, and merger advice.  Still in 2004, the investment arms of the 
two major German commercial banks (Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank) combined had, within 
Germany, only 38.3 percent of the mergers and acquisitions, 21.8 percent of the equity market, and 16.3 
percent of the debt market business (The Economist 13/Nov/2004, p.82). J.P. Morgan, Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs beat the German banks at home because it was an American kind of capitalism.  The 
position of German banks was so bad that a German agency Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau thought it 
best in order to optimize results in the privatization of Deutsche Telekom, the German telephone company, 
that large blocks of shares be auctioned through foreign investment banks rather than through the 
investment bank arms of Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and  other German banks (The Economist 
27/March/2004, p. 75).  
Not only did big earnings in the trading and securities business fail to materialized but German commercial 
banks could not fall back on retail banking as a source of potential growth and to improve income streams. 
Unlike the situation in the UK  where commercial banks successfully diversified through retail finance (but 
similar to what initially Banco Santander and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya faced in Spain), Deutche Bank, 
Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank knew that retail financial markets in the Rhenish model had largely been 
in the hands of savings banks (Sparkasse) and regional banks (Landesbanken).  Despite trying its hand at 
retail finance, Dresdner Bank in 2004 only had 4 percent of the retail banking business in Germany.   
Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank decided that for survival they needed to change.  They  moved quickly 
onto the turf of Anglo-American capitalism, trading in securities and engaging in business consultancy.  
German commercial banks also decided to push credit cards, mutual funds, life insurance, and other fee- 
earning products and services customary  in US retail banking today.  They shifted from the kingly 
merchant tradition in retail banking, from an environment of trust towards one of persuasion. 
If deemed necessary, the steps were not easily made.  Dresdner Bank found that out with the acquisition of 
Kleinwort Benson and Wasserstein Parella. The acquisitions which amalgamated Dresdner Bank with  
investment banking operations in the US (which had been developed as early as 1967) to become Dresdner-
Kleinwort-Benson in 1995 and Dresdner-Kleinwort-Wasserstein (DKW) in 2000.  The losses of DKW 
since its formation were in the millions. This lackluster performance resulted in Dresdner Bank, the parent 
company, moving from an operating profit at the formation of DKW in 2000 to a massive operating loss in 
2002 – when Allianz took over Dresdner Bank.
1  
                                                                   
1 Specifically, operating profits of 906 and 694 million euro in 1999 and 2000 turned to operating losses of 
844, 2308 and 228 respectively in 2001, 2002 and 2003. Then 2004 saw a return to profitability with 
operating profits of 611 million euro, which were still below those of 2000 but above 1998’a performance 
of 405 million euro (Dresdner Bank, Annual Report and Accounts, 2004).  
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3.4  Co-determination 
Although Americans did not detest the Rhenish Model of Capitalism like they did Communism, the co-
existence of the Rhenish and the Atlantic models has always been an uneasy one because of co-
determination.  General Lucius Clay, who headed the occupation authority in the U.S. Zone after the war, 
stymied German efforts to introduce co-determination modes of management in German business as 
Germans assumed increasing control of their civil government in the late 1940s.  The American High 
Commissioner, John J. McCloy, when the Federal Republic appeared in 1949 was not neutral about 
German efforts to create co-determination.  Although recognizing Germany’s right to decide the issue for 
itself, he told German trade unionists not to be surprised when Americans refused to invest in companies 
co-managed by workers.  This was a not too subtle pressure against the adoption of the legislation.  
American private business for its part openly opposed the introduction of co-determination.  Getting wind 
of the proposed German legislation, the National Association of Manufacturers sent a delegation to Europe 
led by Eldridge Haines to lobby against the bill.  Gordon Michler, head of the German Committee in the 
American National Foreign Trade Council, joined the transatlantic sojourn to speak against co-
determination.  And in America a representative of the National Association of Manufacturers wrote an 
open letter to the German Council in New York, published in the New York Times, warning that 
Americans would not invest in German industry if the co-determination bill passed. (Locke, 1996) 
Sometimes the Americans stated, as in the New York Times article, that co-determination was a “new 
socialism in the relations between capitalism and labor.” (Locke, 1996). But they usually, taking a 
proprietary viewpoint, just stressed that the co-determination regime robbed stockholders of their right of 
control.  The critique also stressed that worker involvement in management would bring inefficiency.  One 
commentator, Gilbert Burck, stated in Fortune magazine, after the bill passed (1951) “German labor 
managed to hang what may turn out to be a millstone on the necks of management, consumers, and itself.  
When management and labor go to bed together, it is usually the consumer who gets raped.” “Co-
determination,” he continued “was the worst possible approach to making the economy more dynamic” 
because it would lead to “crippled national productivity, a retarded standard of living, and 
cartels.”(Anonymous 1954). When the Social Democrats enhanced emp loyee participation in co-
determination in the mid1970s, the Americans again protested.  Henry Ford III, visiting his company’s 
factories in Cologne at the time of the debate in the German Bundestag, deplored the new legislation’s 
infringement on the prerogatives of management. (Reported in New York Times, 17 Oct. 1975). 
Americans, with their tradition in marketing and persuasion, blame bad performance in German banks on 
Rhineland forms of management.  They are confident about the superiority of the Atlantic management 
model.  The US invented the term and the phenomenon “management” in the 20
th century.    Between 1948 
and 1966, David M. Gordon reports, “…the ratio of supervisory to non-supervisory employees in the U.S. 
private business sector increased by nearly 75 percent – from roughly 13 supervisory per 100 
nonsupervisory employees to more than 22.”  And American higher education with its graduate schools of  
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business and management and its MBAs developed a system of education to buttress the position of this 
rising managerial caste.   In America management grew to be, to use Heinz Hartmann’s words, “a fourth 
production factor, a strategic variable for the development of the firm.” (Locke, 1996).  It separated itself, 
the thinkers and planners, from the others employees in an organization, the doers.  It assumed the mantel 
of responsibility to the owners in the proprietary model of the firm, worked out the tools of management it 
used, codified them in lexicons of management, and paid itself handsomely for its effort. In the late 20
th 
century compensation in Japan of major CEOs, was 17 times that of the average workers, in Germany, 23-
25 times; in America the CEO/worker pay disparity was 85 to 100 times greater.  The disparity doubled 
during the 1980s and has continued to grow ever since. (Locke, 1996). 
US capitalism might pretend to offer a “whiter than white” governance alternative for multinational 
companies including banks, but in the Enron, Worldcom and Xeroxexamples in the US as well as Paramalt 
in Italy, US banks (i.e. Bank of America and Citigroup) played an active role in facilitating the transactions 
that allowed inept management to bring about the fall of their companies.  These banks did not foot the bill, 
instead the stockholders and the taxpayers had to pay for their mischief.   Certainly, therefore, the 
American charge against Rhenish management is open to question.  But here we are not talking as much 
about actual performance as with perceptions about performance.  Management ineptitude might not have 
had much or anything to do with the comparatively poor performance of German banks but management 
has been perceived to have contributed to German business decline, by Americans and increasingly by 
more and more Germans. 
Whether or not in the new circumstances Rhenish capitalism survives and in what form depends ultimately 
on its ability to compete in Europe and on Europe’s ability to compete globally.  That is also true of the 
Anglo-American system.  In this regard management in the latter has more flexibility to achieve goals.  But 
easy judgements about managerial “efficiency” cannot be made because goals differ in a “proprietary” as 
opposed an  “entity” conceived firm.  Management in the “proprietary” firm seeks to maximize return on 
investment (ROI) and shareholder value.  This idea drives its view of “efficiency.”  German business 
economists began debating the issue as early as the 1920s (Locke, 1984).  One school, headed by Wilhelm 
Rieger of the Nuremberg Commercial Institute took an Anglo-American position.  They simply said that 
the firm had to be considered a Geldfabrik.  A firm’s efficiency could be measured in terms of ROI, the 
more the return on investment, the more efficient the firm.  It is the proprietary conception.  But a second 
school, headed by Heinrich Nicklisch, of the Berlin Commercial Institute, considered “efficiency” from the 
perspective of the firm- entity.  A firm’s efficiency had to be gauged by how well all it parts flourished, i.e., 
its stockholders, employees, and customers, i.e., the efficiency with which is served the community.  If ROI 
were paid at the expense of the workers or customers, it would be a poor yardstick for measuring 
efficiency.  There is important evidence in the US today that profitability, ROI, in famous and not so 
famous U.S. firms is being distributed at the expense of the firm’s employees, whose health plans and 
retirement schemes are being reduced or dropped.  The wealth generated by the firm is being redistributed 
from employees to stockholders and top management.  
  12 
This should surprise nobody.  The money a firm earns might result from economic efficiency in the market, 
but how this money is distributed within the firm is based not on economic efficiency but power, juridical 
based power.   With the Supervisory Board in a German firm composed 50 percent of employee 
representatives, the firm would not pay its top management board (Vorstand) the sort of salaries and 
benefits paid to American corporate executives.  There is no evidence that higher management salaries 
bring better performance.  If the firm is considered to be an entity, its employees could not be treated 
similarly to employees in U.S. firms: fired without or with little notice, robbed of pension funds which the 
firm’s management hadsthe exclusive legal right to administer or to plunder.  Nor could the Rhenish firm 
so easily be moved offshore at the expensive of its domestic labor force in order to increase ROI to its 
stockholders. 
In this inquiry, then, the stakes are high.  They are high for banks’ top managers who have to improve 
profits in a difficult home market.  At Dresdner Bank, they have seemed to be rudderless in the bad 
economy.  After trying to enter investment banking (with Dresdner, Kleinwort and Wasserstein) where they 
expected big money to be earned and instead incurred heavy loses, management seemed to reverse its 
course when it joined Allianz AG and became a bank-assurance company.  The stakes are also high for 
Dresdner Bank’s regional director and other bank directors in Görlitz who, under pressure from parent 
banks to cut costs and improve earnings, have had the additional disadvantage of operating in a part of 
Germany that is particularly depressed economically and demographically.  In the Dresdner Bank retail 
branch in Görlitz, decisions by executives in Frankfurt resulted in a reduction of personnel by twenty-five 
percent in the three years to 2005.  They put pressure on employees to replace fixed salaries with pay-by-
performance schemes.  This smacked of Anglo-Americanization.  The stakes are high, too, for bank 
customers, not only because they need bank loans and services delivered efficiently but because they need 
banks that reflect and support community values.  The difference between the Rhenish and the Anglo-
American model in this respect is great. There is a certain irony in East Europeans having to make this 
systemic choice. Rhineland capitalism developed in West Germany; now its ultimate survival seemed to 
depend on its ability to spread to the New Europe in the former Communist areas, to places like Görlitz and 
the Nysaland border region and beyond.  The Poles who live there had no experience with Rhenish 
capitalism, and the East German experience with it has been of very short duration.  The two peoples also 
lack experience with the Anglo-American banking model.  Their past had been Communist.  Whether after 
fifty years, it had made them more susceptible to the adoption of the Rhenish model in the banking sector 
than the Anglo-American, within a depressed economy, was not clear.  So the team set out in its 
questionnaire to find out.  
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4  The Design of the Survey and Questionnaire 
4.1.1  Response Categories 
Archival research and three in-depth interviews helped to frame the questionnaire about cross-border 
banking practice in retail markets in the Zgorzelec-Görlitz region and the state of the Rhenish model of 
governance.  Archival research considered  
1)  transcripts of three separate, one hour, in depth interviews with bank CEOs and heads of planning in 
Germany. These interviews took place in June 1999 in Munich and Frankfurt and included managers 
with direct responsibilities in the Dresdner Bank and HypoVereinsbank. Transcripts of two similar in 
depth interviews with executives of Allied Irish Banks (AIB) were also available. They provide basic 
information about major areas of concern for commercial banks (see further Bátiz-Lazo and Wood, 
1999; Bátiz-Lazo and Wood, 2003).  
2)  a consultant’s report on the strategy of  AIB in Poland. This report, dated in 1999 had been 
commissioned because of the frustration of Irish managers with the lack of progress in the process of 
amalgamating recently acquired operations in Poland. The report considered issues on how to best 
deal with Polish employees as well as Polish clients in retail financial markets.  
3)  30 teaching case studies deposited at the European Case Clearing House in Cranfield between 1998 
and 2005. Teaching case studies are primarily a didactic tool. However, selected cases were all based 
on field work and helped identify issues of high strategic priority for banking in Germany and Poland. 
4)  25 articles and business surveys published between November 1998 and June 2005 in the Financial 
Times and The Economist. The articles focused on banking in Germany and, Eastern Europe, or on 
Dresdner Bank.  
The analysis of transcribed interviews, the consultant’s report, teaching case studies, newspaper articles and 
surveys strengthened triangulation throughout the research (Yin, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989; Robson, 1993).  
Along side archival research, four separate in depth interviews with Mr. Lehmann of the Dresdner Bank 
took place between May and June 2005. Notes were made during these interviews.  Again, triangulation 
with several sources helped to avoid relying on this single informant to ascertain areas of greatest concern 
to Dresdner Bank in Görlitz.  
From these sources the basic agenda that shaped the questionnaire about retail financial market in the 
Zgorzelec-Görlitz region emerged.   It postulated three broad areas in local banking for the interviewer-
administered questionnaire to cover: 
1) Questions pertaining to employee participation,  
2) Questions pertaining to the bank’s relation with the outside world, the “kingly merchant” tradition, and 
3) Questions that were specifically about cross-border banking practices of Poles into Görlitz.    
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The participants worked up a total of 53 questions on the three topics which were originally drafted in 
English. Native German and Polish speakers then translated the questions into German and Polish. 
Following the same procedure, German and Polish versions were independently translated back into 
English in order to assure ourselves each version portrayed the same meaning and different versions were 
consistent with each other.  
When perceptions of service might not actually be transactions in retail financial markets, SERVQUAL 
measures are the tried and tested model to find the gap in service expectations. However, given the 
exploratory nature of our survey it seemed more appropriate to use inductively developed questions, based 
on a five point Liker scale, throughout the interview schedule for response categories, rather than categories 
based on the SERVQUAL model. Moreover, for purposes of greater clarity during the discussion the five 
point Liker scale (that is whether respondents “strongly agree, rather agree, are indifferent, rather disagree, 
or strongly disagree”) was compressed into three categories:  
1) Agree (which collapses strongly agree together with rather agree)  
2) Indifferent (which means the respondent considered the question unimportant) and  
3) Disagree (which collapses together strongly disagree with rather disagree). 
4.1.2  Targeted Population and Research Methods 
According to Mr. Lehmann, Polish clients who had opened an account in Germany represented 0.25 
percent of the total clients with a current account at the Dresdner Bank retail branch in Görlitz. Considering 
the lack of a detailed population list of actual and potential Polish individuals (and businesses) willing (and 
able) to engage in retail banking transactions in Germany, we thought the use of a postal survey inadequate 
when approaching a larger group of people with a similar profile. Surveying by email and telephone also 
proved fruitless. Mr. Lehmann and a consultant firm banking with him drafted a roster of 122 German and 
Polish contacts. This list of potential contacts included telephone and email details for 25 Poles and 97 
Germans, of which 11 and 32 had indicated a willingness to collaborate with the study.  In the end, no 
Poles and only 15 Germans actually responded. Despite Mr. Lehmann’s personal intervention, moreover, 
few Polish customers of Dresdner Bank Görlitz participated in the survey, too few to be helpful.  Hence our 
original intent to make local Dresdner Bank clients a special part of the investigation had to be dropped. 
Instead, canvass workers delivered by hand self-administered questionnaires to randomly selected long-
term residents of Zgorzelec and Görlitz. The personal delivery of self-administered questionnaires to 
randomly selected people who appear at the location of interest is considered a valid surveying technique 
and has been successfully used in a number of contexts (Dillman, 2000).  
In total 91 questionnaires were collected from Poles (35 percent), 90 from Germans (35 percent), on a 
random basis, in the Zgorzelec-Görlitz region. The work procedure resulted in a 95 percent response rate 
for randomly selected people in Zgorzelec and Görlitz.  A further 80 questionnaires were collected from a  
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control group in London (30 percent of total). This group, also randomly selected, had the advantage of 
being far from a border region, unlike those living in Zgorzelec and Görlitz. The group in London also had 
no direct experience with a Communist regime, strong unions or legislation promoting co-determination. 
Moreover, the population of London lived in a world-class financial centre and was ethnically diverse 
unlike the ethnically homogeneous population in Zgorzelec and Görlitz.
2  London and the UK  also had had 
higher employment
3 and economic growth
4 levels than Poland and Germany in the five years to 2005. Both 
sterling and zloty had a free float exchange rate regime with the euro because both the UK and Poland 
pursued an independent monetary policy.  Given this dissimilarities, the London group constituted an 
excellent control group for the Poles and Germans who contributed to the survey. 
We carried out Analyses of Variance (one-way ANOVA) to test differences in the average value of the 
responses. Categories emerged around five groupings, namely: 
•  national origin: as mentioned 91 Polish contributors represented 35 percent of the total 
respondents, 90 German 35 percent of total and 80 British 30 percent of the total; 
•  gender: there were 129 males (49 percent), 118 females (45 percent) and 14 undisclosed (5 
percent) contributors; 
•  age: three contributors were 19 or less years of age (1 percent), 117 contributors were between 20 
and 34 years (45 percent), 88 contributors between 35 and 49 (34 percent), 32 contributors were 
between 50 and 64 (12 percent ) and 5 contributors were 65 or older (2 percent ). Sixteen failed to 
disclose (6 percent);  
•  employment status: forty-two respondents were unemployed (16 percent), 180 were employed (69 
percent) and 28 were self-employed (11 percent)
5 while 11 failed to disclose (4 percent); and  
                                                                   
2 The preeminence of ethnical and cultural diversity in London was evident as nine respondents (11 
percent) identified themselves as proficient in non-European languages such as Urdu (4 respondents), Hindi 
(1 respondent), Aafrikaan (1 respondent), Arabic (1 respondent) and dialects of sub-Sahara Africa (4 
respondents). This as opposed to purely European languages for Germans (English, French, Spanish and 
even Latin) and Poles (German Russian and English).  
3 The Regional Statistical Office for the State of Saxony (Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen) 
estimated open unemployment in December 2003 for Görlitz at 25.9 percent and 24.0 percent for Zgorgelec 
(http://www.statistik.sachsen.de, accessed 14 Aug 2005). At the same time, between 1992 and 2004 
unemployment in Saxony had been growing at a annual average rate of 2 percent to 9.6 percent. 
Unemployment in London was estimated at 7 percent in 2005 (http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/, accessed 14 
Aug 2005). 
4 According to Eurostat, average growth in per capita GDP between 2000 and 2005 in Germany, Poland 
and the UK was 1.08 percent, 2.18 percent and 3.71 percent respectively (http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/, 
accessed 14 Aug 2005).  
5 Interestingly one Polish contributor and three British were single traders (together representing one 
percent of the sample), 26 worked in firms with one to nine persons (10 percent), 63 in small firms of ten to 
49 persons (24 percent), 32 in mid-sized firms with 50 to 250 employees (12 percent) and 83 in large firms 
of 250 or more employees (32 percent) while 53 contributors (20 percent) failed to disclose.  
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•  level of education: twenty one respondents only had ten years of basic schooling (8 percent), 65 a 
high school certificate (25 percent), 54 an apprenticeship or vocational training (21 percent), 83 
university degrees (32 percent), 31 postgraduate qualifications (12 percent ) and seven failed to 
specify (2 percent).  
Where appropriate, one-way ANOVA were followed by post-hoc comparisons using a Scheffe test. The 
post-hoc comparison allowed us to avoid making any a priori statements about how the above categories 
could influence a perception of employee participation or a perception of the ‘kingly merchant’ tradition. 
For this borderland region we were interested in the other factors (education level, age, employment, etc.) 
only in so far as they effect what the questionnaire tells us about national outcomes and comparisons in the 
three subject area, for, if responses to questions differed by education levels, etc., and the distribution of 
these factors was not quite the same in each national group, then factors other than national outlook could 
influence the national comparisons.  Generally that was not the case, but there were some exceptions.  In 
questions about employee participation respondents with university degrees opposed co-determination (up 
to 53 percent for one question) while respondents with 10 years of schooling favored it (up to 58 percent in 
one question).  And post graduate degree holders favored co-determination the most (up to 65 percent in 
one question).   In questions about age, the older respondents opposed co-determination much more than 
the younger  (up to 56 percent in one question for age cohort 50-64 opposed, up to 34 percent in age cohort 
35-49).  Among the self-employed a higher percentage of respondents (up to 48 percent in one question) 
opposed employee participation in management than among the employed (up to 34 percent).  
 Since in the general pool 75 percent of the self-employed were German, 21 percent British and 4 percent 
Polish, the distribution affected comparisons about national outlook.  The same was true in education, more 
British had 10 years of schooling in the pool (52 percent) than Poles (33 percent) and Germans (14 
percent). More Poles were university graduates (42 percent) than Germans (31 percent) or British (27 
percent).  For age distribution, 38 percent of the 50-64 cohort was Polish, 35 percent German, and 13 
percent British. 6  These percentages when statistically significant were not numerically so; they often 
covered a small number in the cohort.  If 65 percent of the British aged 50-64 in the pool favored co-
determination, that was only 3 people, if 84 percent of the post graduates in the cohort were British, that 
only amounted to a handful of people.   
Differences between groups, then, were overwhelmingly statistically significant (at the 95 percent level) 
when dividing the sample by national origin and these were true national differences, not distortions of 
differences introduced by age, education, and other factors. National differences were more noticeable for 
questions about employee participation than about expectations in banking services. Results of statistically 
significant national differences in the average score are now discussed in detail. 
                                                                   
6 For the sake of brevity the results of these calculations are not offered here but are available from the 
corresponding author upon request.  
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5  Employee Participation in the Governance of Banks 
5.1  Participation 
This part of the survey discusses, from different perspectives, a total of ten questions that confront the issue 
of employee participation in the management and administration of banks.  
Three questions deal directly with banking employees participation in management.  One  considered it as a 
matter of right, the right of employees to participate as in the entity concept of the firm:  “Employees in a 
bank, to protect their interest, should have an important voice in the firm’s management.”  Another takes 
the opposite track:  “A firm’s stockholders (owners) have the exclusive right to select a bank’s managers.”  
This expresses the proprietary concept of the firm.  The third asks if the firm the respondent works in, given 
the choice, “should adopt schemes where employees take part in the management of the firm.”  It is not 
about banking firms but about the many types of firms in which the respondents work.  With this question, 
the subject of worker participation in management becomes less abstract to the respondent because it is 
about his/her specific workplace. Table 3 below summarizes survey results. 
Table 3: Respondents view of participation of employees in management (Ger, Pol and UK) - 2005 
 (Percent of total responses. Missing values excluded.) 
    Polish  German  British 
Agree  6  7%  15  17%  59  74% 
Indifferent  27  31%  17  20%  17  21% 
Disagree  53  62%  55  63%  4  5% 
Employees in a bank, to 
protect their interest, 
should have an important 
voice in the firm’s 
management.  Sum  86  100%  87  100%  80  100% 
               
Agree  30  35%  31  36%  32  40% 
Indifferent  25  29%  22  26%  13  16% 
Disagree  31  36%  32  38%  35  44% 
A firm’s stockholders 
(owners) have the 
exclusive right to select a 
bank’s managers.  Sum  86  100%  85  100%  80  100% 
               
Agree  10  12%  17  21%  53  67% 
Indifferent  30  35%  24  29%  16  20% 
Disagree  46  53%  41  50%  10  13% 
If given the choice, my 
firm should allow 
employees to take part in 
the management of the 
firm.  Sum  86  100%  82  100%  79  100% 
 
Sixty-two percent of Polish respondents to the first question and 63 percent of the Germans thought that 
employees should not have a right to participate in a bank’s management.  Only seven percent of Poles and 
17 percent of Germans thought they should.  On the other hand, in the British group 74 percent of the 
respondents thought that employees have a right to participate in management, 5 percent thought not.  The 
rest of the answers were “indifferent.”
7  For one question 35 percent of the Poles thought stockholders 
should have exclusive rights to select management, 36 percent disagreed; 36 percent of Germans thought 
                                                                   
7 Responses to this question by Poles and Germans were not statistically significant at a 95 percent level of 
confidence.  
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stockholders should select management, 38 percent that they should not.  Forty percent of British 
respondents felt that stockholders had an exclusive right to select management and 44 percent that they 
should not.  The number of “indifferent” among the Poles and the Germans were much larger (29 percent 
and 26 percent respectively) than among the British (16 percent).  To the question whether respondents 
wished employee participation in management where they worked, 53 percent of the Poles answered “no”, 
12 percent of them “yes”; 50 percent of the Germans answered “no” and 17 percent “yes”.
8  On the other 
hand, 67 percent of British respondents thought employees should participate in management where they 
worked and 13 percent thought not.  The responses for all the other questions in this group are similar, with 
the Poles and Germans excluding employee participation and the British favoring it. 
5.2  Efficiency 
Four questions deal with how participation in bank management might effect a firm economically.  They 
are not about a right but about how the practice of worker participation impacts efficiency.  It is possible 
that people might feel employees have a right to participate but that it would harm efficiency, that the two 
are in conflict with each other. Two of these four questions are similar, although they pose the question in 
opposite ways.  The idea behind repetition of the questions with slightly different wording is to see if 
respondent groups are consistent in their answers.  Table 4 below summarizes survey results. 
Table 4: Respondents view of efficiency and employees in management (Ger, Pol and UK) - 2005 
 (Percent of total responses. Missing values excluded.) 
 
    Polish  German  British 
Agree  0  0%  9  11%  66  83% 
Indifferent  21  24%  25  31%  9  11% 
Disagree  65  76%  47  58%  5  6% 
Employee participation in 
management improves the 
bank’s management. 
Sum  86  100%  81  100%  80  100% 
               
Agree  30  35%  46  55%  21  27% 
Indifferent  22  26%  25  30%  12  15% 
Disagree  34  40%  13  15%  46  58% 
The interests of the 
customer are best served 
in firms in which the 
employees have little say 
in management.  Sum  86  100%  84  100%  79  100% 
               
Agree  0  0%  19  23%  39  49% 
Indifferent  19  22%  39  46%  10  13% 
Disagree  67  78%  26  31%  31  39% 
Participation of 
employees in the 
management of a bank 
hinders the bank’s overall 
efficiency.  Sum  86  100%  84  100%  80  100% 
               
Agree  47  55%  32  39%  30  38% 
Indifferent  22  26%  31  38%  12  15% 
Disagree  17  20%  19  23%  37  47% 
Employee participation in 
management significantly 
hinders the bank’s 
management from serving 
the firm’s customer 
efficiently.  Sum  86  100%  82  100%  79  100% 
                                                                   
8 Responses to this question by Poles and Germans were not statistically significant at a 95 percent level of 
confidence.  
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Whether employee participation could promote a bank’s efficiency, no Poles and only 9 percent of the 
Germans responded  to positively while 76 percent of the Poles and 58 percent of the Germans thought 
employee participation would bring inefficiency.
9   To the question which says that the interests of a firm’s 
customers are best served where employees have little say in management, 35 percent of the Poles and 55 
percent of the Germans agreed, while 40 percent of the Poles and 15 percent of the Germans disagreed.   
The proportion of German affirmative answers to both these questions is similar but there is an incongruity 
between the Polish response to the two questions, since 40 percent of the Polish respondents to one 
question thought customer interest could be served even if employee participated in bank management, and 
no Poles responded positively to the idea in another question that employee participation improved 
management. 
The British response to both questions produces another incongruity.  Eighty-three percent of British 
respondents to the first question saw no detrimental effect on customer service resulting from employee 
participation in management, only six percent saw a detrimental effect.  But 58 percent of the British 
respondents to the second question disagreed with its tenet that employee participation hurt management, as 
against 27 percent who thought that it did not.  Still if more British responses favored employee 
participation in management in the first question, more also favored employee participation in the second; 
which was not the case with the Poles whose overall response in the second question was negative (40 
percent negatively assessing employee participation and 35 percent giving it a positive evaluation). 
The other two questions in this group are about employee participation in bank management, and 
efficiency.  To  a third question which states employee participation hinders a bank’s overall efficiency, 
none of the Polish respondents agreed and but  23 percent of German did; 78 percent of Poles disagreed and 
31 percent of the Germans.
10 The number of  “indifferent” in both national groups, however, was quite high 
(46 percent for the Germans, 22 percent for the Poles).  Forty-nine percent of British respondents thought 
participation hindered a bank’s overall efficiency, 39 percent did not.  The number of “indifferent” at 13 
percent was much smaller than for the Poles and Germans.   
To the fourth question 55 percent of the Poles agreed that employee participation hindered the bank’s 
management from serving customer interests, and 39 percent of the Germans.  Twenty percent of the Poles 
disagreed, 23 percent of the Germans, and 26 percent of Poles and 38 percent of Germans were 
“indifferent”.  Thirty-eight percent of the British agreed that it hindered efficiency but 47 percent did not.  
15 percent of the British were indifferent.
11  The incongruity here is between Polish answers to third and 
                                                                   
9 Responses to this question by Poles and Germans were not statistically significant at a 95 percent level of 
confidence. 
10 Responses to this question by British and Germans were not statistically significant at a 95 percent level 
of confidence. 
11 Responses to this question by British and Germans were not statistically significant at a 95 percent level 
of confidence.  
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fourth questions, the same question really, if with slightly different wording.  Many more Poles thought 
employee participation hindered a bank’s efficiency (54 percent) answering one question than they did 
when answering the other (zero percent).   
5.3  Co-determination in each Nation 
The three questions in this section ask about opinions on co-determination for each of the three countries 
separately instead, as in the previous questions, as a general category of observation. See Table 5. 
Table 5: Respondents view of co-determination (Ger, Pol and UK) - 2005 
(Percent of total responses. Missing values excluded.) 
    Polish  German  British 
Agree  2  2%  11  13%  16  20% 
Indifferent  39  45%  44  54%  52  66% 
Disagree  45  52%  27  33%  11  14% 
Employee participation in 
management gives 
German banks a 
competitive advantage in 
the international arena  Sum  86  100%  82  100%  79  100% 
 
 
Poland and UK only 
Agree  2  2%      31  39% 
Indifferent  40  47%      35  44% 
Disagree  44  51%      13  16% 
If employees took part in 
the management of 
Polish/British firms this 
would give Polish/British 
firms a competitive 
advantage in the 
international arena.  Sum  86  100%      79  100% 
               
Agree  1  1%      48  61% 
Indifferent  34  40%      24  30% 
Disagree  51  59%      7  9% 
Polish/British firms 
should adopt schemes 
where employees took 
part in the management of 
the firm. 
Sum  86  100%      79  100% 
 
About half of the respondents were “indifferent” when asked if participation of employees in the 
management of German banks gave them an international competitive advantage (45 percent of Poles, 54 
percent of Germans and 66 percent of British). But the other half of the respondents provided quite 
different answers.  Only two percent of the Poles and 13 percent of the Germans agreed; 52 percent of 
Poles and 33 percent of Germans disagreed.  Of the British respondents 20 percent agreed and 14 percent 
disagreed.  So the British respondents were more favorable  to the idea that participation in Germans banks 
promoted efficiency than Poles and the Germans. 
To the next question, which asked the same question about Polish banks, 2 percent of Poles in our survey  
thought Polish banks would gain a competitive advantage if employees participated in management, 51 
percent thought not (but 47 percent of the Poles were “indifferent” to the issue).   The British respondents' 
evaluated employee participation in British banks much more positive than the Poles; 39 percent believed 
the British banks would enhance their international competitiveness, 16 percent that it would not.  Forty-
four percent of British respondents were “indifferent.”  To the question, whether Polish (British) firms  
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should adopt employee participation schemes in management, only one Pole responded affirmatively (one 
percent), but 59 percent responded negatively (40 percent were “indifferent”).  For the British the results 
were almost the reverse, 61 percent affirmative, nine percent negative (30 percent were “indifferent.”) 
In their answers to questions in this group, therefore, Poles were against the view that employee 
participation enhanced the international competitiveness of Polish banks, the Germans, if less 
pronouncedly, thought the same about their banks, and the British (39 percent to 16 percent) felt that 
employee participation in British bank management would promote its international competitiveness. 
5.4  Discussion 
What can  be concluded generally about employee participation from the results of this section of the 
questionnaire?  Certainly it cannot be said that after fifteen years of living within the Rhineland capitalist 
model, that Germans in Görlitz had become converts to co-determination and employee participation.  On 
the contrary, the Germans polled felt that employee participation in German bank management was neither 
justified as a right or on grounds of efficiency.  The Polish data with one exception is even more 
unfavorable to employee participation in management.   Does this mean that the Poles and Germans have 
become advocates of an “Atlantic” model of capitalism, which excludes employees from bank 
management?  Perhaps, but not consciously.  Our feeling is that it simply means that Poles and Germans 
living in this region have retained a mentality acquired under fifty years of Communism and a long history 
of authoritarianism. 
Under Communism management operated top down.  People worked, kept their noses clean and did not 
rock the boat.  Anecdotal evidence supports this conclusion.  Locke reports that a Görlitz contractor, who 
had lived most of his life under Communism once told him:  “You know, Herr Professor, the society of the 
German Democratic Republic was the perfect society.  Everybody had health care, food, education, 
vacations, etc.; everybody worked and had retirement.  There was only one thing wrong.  The society did 
not have the capacity to renew itself.”  He meant, of course, that everybody followed orders, nobody took 
any chances, there was no entrepreneurialism in the place.  Employee participation in management requires 
employee initiative.  The Poles’ and Germans’ doubts about employee participation reflects the mentality 
of Communism more than Anglo-American capitalism, about which they knew nothing. 
On the other hand, British answers to the questionnaire suggest democratic traditions.  British respondents 
did not generally believe that employees participation in management hurt a bank’s efficiency; it might 
even help it to be even more efficient.  However, 48 percent of British respondents’ thought that it was best 
to pay bank employees by performance (commissions) rather than fixed salaries (19 percent were 
indifferent and 34 percent disagreed)  This meant that the British favored fostering individual initiative in 
employees through the pay scheme while favoring at the same time employee participation in management.      
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6  Bank Relations with Customers:  Rhineland kingly 
merchant outlook vs Anglo-American marketing view  
6.1  Kingly Merchant Tradition 
Since local retail banking concerned us, none of the questions in this part pertained to investment banking 
issues.  Rather we wished to ascertain what respondents in each country thought about banking relations 
based on reputation and trust as opposed to efficiency and persuasion, how they reacted to the introduction 
of new products and services sold aggressively by marketing specialists patterning their efforts on Anglo-
American practice.    
W used six questions, four of which tried to elicit respondents feelings about the kingly merchant tradition. 
See Table 6.  Inasmuch as the respondents may never have heard the words “kingly merchant tradition” the 
four questions could not ask about it directly.  So they get at the subject by referring to various aspects of 
that tradition.  One question asks if the respondent likes bank personnel to take the initiative in the 
marketing of product or services or if he/she wishes to take the initiative.  Selection of the second option 
suggests that the respondent rejects aggressive hard-sell Anglo-American style marketing for the kingly 
merchant soft sell.   Another asks the respondent whether his chances to get a loan from a bank would 
improve if he/she had been a long-term client of a bank.  In other words, did the respondent think that trust 
build on long-term relationship would count in the decision-making.  The third asks the respondent if 
he/she prefers to deal with one person in one bank, his/her banker, rather than with numerous specialists 
located perhaps in more than one place who handle particular products and services.  The last asks the 
respondent if he/she prefers that a bank’s employees be paid by performance (commissions) instead of a 
fixed salary.  Preference for performance-based pay would mean favoring aggressive marketing and 
perhaps over-attentive service. 
To the first question only did the Germans respond in the majority (61 percent) that they preferred to take 
the initiate themselves when investigating new products and services; 30 percent accepted the notion that 
the bank take the initiative in peddling new products and services to them, and nine percent did not care 
who took this initiative.  Among Poles the percentage who preferred to take their own initiative (37 
percent) was much lower than with the Germans, the number who accepted the bank’s initiative was 35 
percent.  A much larger percentage of Poles did not care who took the initiative (27 percent) than Germans 
(nine percent).  Among the respondents the British most preferred that banks take the initiative (43 
percent); 33 percent favored that customers takes this initiative and 25 percent did not care if the bank or 
the customer takes the initiative.  These responses fit expected patterns, with the British most favorable to 
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Table 6: Respondents view of  “kingly merchant” tradition (Ger, Pol and UK) - 2005 
 (Percent of total responses. Missing values excluded.) 
 
    Polish  German  British 
Initiative of 
the bank  32  35%  27  30%  34  43% 
Indifferent  25  27%  8  9%  20  25% 
Own 
initiative  34  37%  55  61%  26  33% 
Do you object to bank 
personnel taking the 
initiative to inform you 
about the products and 
services the bank offers, 
or do you prefer to take 
the initiative to inform 
yourself about your 
bank’s products and 
services and then if you 
are interested approach 
the bank personnel about 
them?  Sum  91  100%  90  100%  80  100% 
               
Only one  50  55%  55  61%  39  49% 
Indifferent  13  14%  14  16%  8  10% 
Various 
specialists  28  31%  21  23%  33  41% 
Do you like to deal with 
one person in a bank 
(your banker) or with 
various specialists who 
sell certain products or 
services (insurance, small 
loans, etc.)? 
Sum  91  100%  90  100%  80  100% 
               
Agree  39  45%  61  68%  68  85% 
Indifferent  6  7%  6  7%  4  5% 
Disagree  41  48%  23  26%  8  10% 
If you wanted credit, do 
you think you could get it 
more easily if you have 
been with the same bank 
for many years?  Sum  86  100%  90  100%  80  100% 
               
Agree  11  13%  41  47%  38  48% 
Indifferent  28  33%  18  21%  15  19% 
Disagree  47  55%  28  32%  27  34% 
Clients of a bank will 
get better service if the 
bank employees are 
paid by performance 
(commissions) instead 
of a fixed salary.  Sum  86  100%  87  100%  80  100% 
 
To the second of this group’s questions, whether the respondent preferred to deal with one banker in the 
“kingly merchant” tradition, 61 percent of the Germans said “yes,” 23 percent wished to deal with “various 
specialists” and 14 percent did not care.  The Polish response was slightly less favorable to the kingly 
merchant viewpoint, with 55 percent preferring “one banker,” 31 percent “various specialists,” and 14 
percent “indifferent”.  Not surprisingly, the British were also favorable to dealing with just one banker (49 
percent), with 41 percent favoring to deal with the appropriate specialists and 14 percent registering 
“indifferent”. 
Most respondents in each nation agreed to another question that a long-term relationship with a bank would 
enhance a client’s ability to get a loan.  But the British favored the idea the most (85 percent to 68 percent 
for the Germans and 45 percent for the Poles).  Poles and Germans also thought that a long-term  
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relationship with a bank would not likely help to secure a loan: 48 percent of Poles and 26 percent of 
Germans thought it  was “not likely to help” but only ten percent of the British thought a long-term  
relationship was , “not likely to help”).  Responses to this question do not justify a conclusion that the 
British, when seeking a loan, less appreciated the usefulness of having a long-term relationship with a bank. 
Rather, they reflect that the British were less likely to change their cheque account to another bank than 
Germans or Poles. 
6.2  Supermarket of Financial and Non-Financial Services 
The two questions in this group explore how respondents feel towards the introduction of new products and 
services in banks (s. Table 7 below). One considers their attitude towards start-up business counseling 
which has become an important subject recently in the US because of the IT revolution and the frequent 
mounting of business plan competitions (see Locke and Schoene, 2004).  Another in subsections devoted to 
“legal services,” “notary services”, “insurance”, “bank logistics,” and “IT services” considers how much 
Polish and British respondents (the Germans are excluded) expect a local cross border bank to expand 
beyond traditional banking, how much the retail bank customers especially in Poland, under the influence 
of Anglo-American market-driven capitalism, have developed a taste and need for the broader palette of 
cross-border banking products and services. 
To the question about the need for banks to provide special counseling for start-up a business, 84 percent of 
the British respondents agreed, followed by 68 percent of the Poles and 55 percent of the Germans.  From 
the Germans came a much higher percentage of “indifferent” answers (37 percent as opposed to 12 percent 
for the Poles and 14 percent for the British respondents).  The higher number of German to Polish 
“indifferent” answers for this question could mean that Germans have less need for business counseling 
than Poles because the German welfare system and unemployment benefits are much more generous than 
in Poland, thereby dampening the urge to start-up businesses. 
The British were less positive than Poles about the need for banks to develop new non-financial services for 
cross border patrons.  Eighty-nine percent of Polish respondents want legal services in cross-border banks 
(British 52 percent), 86 percent of Poles want notary services (British 31 percent), 86 percent of Poles want 
insurance made available through banks (British 45 percent), 60 percent of Poles want to have access to 
logistics services through a retail bank branch (British 32 percent)
12, and 40 percent of the Poles want IT 
services (British 36 percent).  Except for IT services, the Polish demand for these services cross border is 
much greater than the British.  This signifies that the Poles seek modern banking services in expanding 
product and service lines.  But it may not mean that British respondents are less demanding in this regard.  
It could just mean that they feel that these services are readily available outside banks.  
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Table 7: Respondents view on non-financial services (Ger, Pol and UK) - 2005 
 (Percent of total responses. Missing values excluded.) 
 
    Polish  German  British 
Agree  51  68%  47  55%  64  84% 
Indifferent  9  12%  32  37%  11  14% 
Disagree  15  20%  7  8%  1  1% 
Do you expect your 
bank to have special 
counsellors for people 
starting-up a business? 
  Sum  75  100%  86  100%  76  100% 
 
 
Poland and UK only 
Agree  10  14%      55  70% 
Indifferent  33  45%      13  16% 
Disagree  30  41%      11  14% 
Are you interested in a 
long term relationship 
with Dresdner 
Bank/main bank?  Sum  73  100%      79  100% 
               
  Would you be interested in your main bank* facilitating contacts with other 
service providers for your business dealings overseas (i.e. outside of the UK) 
[in Germany]? 
Legal services  Agree  81  89%      40  52% 
  Indifferent  6  7%      13  17% 
  Disagree  4  4%      24  31% 
  Sum  91  100%      77  100% 
               
Notary services  Agree  78  86%      24  31% 
  Indifferent  8  9%      22  29% 
  Disagree  5  5%      31  40% 
  Sum  91  100%      77  100% 
               
Insurance  Agree  78  86%      34  45% 
  Indifferent  10  11%      14  18% 
  Disagree  3  3%      28  37% 
  Sum  91  100%      76  100% 
               
Logistics  Agree  53  60%      25  32% 
  Indifferent  25  28%      24  31% 
  Disagree  10  11%      28  36% 
  Sum  88  100%      77  100% 
               
IT services  Agree  35  40%      28  36% 
  Indifferent  38  44%      20  26% 
  Disagree  14  16%      29  38% 
  Sum  87  100%      77  100% 
* By main bank we mean the provider with which the respondent engaged in most of his/her financial 
transactions and/or which housed the largest share of deposits and/or savings. 
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6.3  Discussion 
In their responses to the questions in this section the Poles seem to be much less trustful of banks.  They 
feel less sure about the usefulness of long-term relations with a bank, much more skeptical about banking 
services being anything more than a profit calculation, and ready themselves to switch banks for high 
interest and lower banking costs.  The Germans, on the other hand, ex press in their views more of a kingly 
merchant tradition, with desires to deal with one bank over a long period of time and to establish personal 
relations with a banker.  The British also believed that establishing long-term relations with a bank could be 
useful, but they were more susceptible to the idea that banks had to operate efficiently in the market, by 
paying employees by performance, and making various experts available to market the many products 
necessary for success in modern banking. 
7  Retail Banking in the German-Polish Border 
7.1  Expectations and Practices 
The third part of the questionnaire is about banking practices in the Zgorzelec-Görlitz region specially 
attuned to Poles banking in Görlitz. Where appropriate, the pool of respondents excludes the British control 
group because of the local focus. 
The first group of questions considers retail banking expectations and practices.  One asks why the 
respondent chooses a bank (reputation, reliability, trust, etc.), a second asks if the respondent would be 
ready to switch his/her account from one bank to get a loan, a third asks if the respondent would switch 
accounts for lower fees; Question four asks if he would switch for lower fees if the bank were foreign, and 
five asks if the respondent has ever in fact switched an account.  Six asks if the respondent has a credit card 
in a bank other than his main bank.  These questions follow up on the ones asked in the previous section 
about the development of Anglo-American type marketing in banks.  
Table 8 summarizes the answers of Poles, British and Germans to the question about reasons for choosing a 
bank.  The answers do not surprise.  Matters of banks size (only 33 percent of Poles thought it important or 
rather important, 31 percent of Germans as did 51 percent of British), or of a bank being “recommended by 
a friend or family (only 28 percent of Poles thought that important, 44 percent of the Germans and 49 
percent of the British) counted for far less in their decision-to choose a bank than “trust” (96 percent of 
Poles, 98 percent of Germans and 93 percent of British cited this as important or rather important), 
“reliability” (96 percent Poles, 97 percent Germans and 98 percent of British), “proven quality of service” 
(78 percent of Poles, 91 percent of Germans and 95 percent of British), “levels of fees and interest” (99 
percent of Poles, 92 percent of Germans and 85 percent of British), “speedier service” (97 percent of Poles, 
83 percent of Germans and 91 percent), and branch location (Poles 79 percent, Germans 78 percent and 
British 58 percent). Both efficiency and moral factors were stressed as most important inducements in their 
answers.  
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Table 8: Main determinants to select provider of retail financial services (Ger, Pol and UK) – 2005 
(Percent of total responses. Missing values excluded.) 
    Polish  German  British 
Reputation  Agree  60  66%  64  74%  71  89% 
  Indifferent  10  11%  17  20%  3  4% 
  Disagree  21  23%  5  6%  6  8% 
  Sum  91  100%  86  100%  80  100% 
               
Trust  Agree  86  96%  85  98%  74  93% 
  Indifferent  2  2%  2  2%  4  5% 
  Disagree  2  2%  0  0%  2  3% 
  Sum  90  100%  87  100%  80  100% 
               
Reliability  Agree  85  96%  84  97%  78  98% 
  Indifferent  2  2%  3  3%  2  3% 
  Disagree  2  2%  0  0%  0  0% 
  Sum  89  100%  87  100%  80  100% 
               
Size / Importance  Agree  30  33%  27  31%  40  51% 
  Indifferent  20  22%  21  24%  24  31% 
  Disagree  40  44%  38  44%  14  18% 
  Sum  90  100%  86  100%  78  100% 
               
Proven Quality  Agree  68  78%  78  91%  75  95% 
of Service  Indifferent  14  16%  7  8%  4  5% 
  Disagree  5  6%  1  1%  0  0% 
  Sum  87  100%  86  100%  79  100% 
               
Recommended by  Agree  25  28%  38  44%  39  49% 
Friend or Family  Indifferent  19  21%  25  29%  27  34% 
  Disagree  45  51%  23  27%  14  18% 
  Sum  89  100%  86  100%  80  100% 
               
Location of Retail   Agree  72  79%  69  78%  46  58% 
Branch  Indifferent  9  10%  8  9%  21  26% 
  Disagree  10  11%  11  13%  13  16% 
  Sum  91  100%  88  100%  80  100% 
               
Fees / Interest  Agree  89  99%  81  92%  68  85% 
  Indifferent  1  1%  4  5%  7  9% 
  Disagree  0  0%  3  3%  5  6% 
  Sum  90  100%  88  100%  80  100% 
               
Faster / Speedier   Agree  87  97%  73  83%  73  91% 
Service  Indifferent  2  2%  13  15%  3  4% 
speedier  Disagree  1  1%  2  2%  4  5% 
  Sum  90  100%  88  100%  80  100% 
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Interestingly, not-one of the Poles considered that there could be any other dimension, other than the ones 
on Table 8 above, relevant to select a provider of retail financial services. Germans, however, considered 
possibilities of more automated teller machines (ATM), the retail branch layout as well as the availability 
of counselors important in their decision. British respondent wrote in many other innovations to the items 
suggested in Table 8. They related to quality of service at the branch (“friendliness”, accessibility, positive 
attitude, etc.) as well as services provided centrally (internet interface and call centers). The much more 
demanding British audience reflected a wider availability of services (and providers) in the UK’s retail 
financial markets.  British participants also benefited from a longer tradition where individuals can 
effectively put forwards their demands for quality in services in general as opposed to the dearth of that 
tradition (i.e., non-service past) in Eastern countries until after 1991. 
This is what the respondents expected from a bank, but when it came to what a bank could expect from 
them, then the answers Poles and Germans gave differed. To a question about switching banks as a 
condition for being granted a loan, 71 percent of Poles said they would but only 29 percent of Germans.  To 
the question about switching to another bank if it had lower fees for services, 78 percent of the Poles 
answered “yes,” as against 52 percent of the Germans.  Would they switch for lower fees if it were to a 
foreign bank?  67 percent of the Poles said “yes” and only 15 percent of the Germans.  To the question had 
they ever actually switched banks before, 65 percent of Poles answered “yes,” 42 percent of the Germans.  
To a question, whether they had credit cards with banks other than their main bank, 59 percent of the Poles 
answered “yes,” 28 percent of the Germans.   The relatively less loyalty of Poles suggests two things: that 
the kingly merchant tradition is stronger in Germany and that it would be easier for the Germans bankers to 
get Poles to come to Görlitz to do  banking than for the Polish bankers to get Germans to come to 
Zgorzelec. 
7.2  Cross-Border Banking 
This group of questions specifically asks Polish respondents about cross-border banking in Görlitz.  Many 
questions ask about the products and services the Poles seek in German banks and their reasons for opening 
accounts there.  Four ask about the needs for Poles in Görlitz banks to have services offered in Polish or 
English; one asks the Poles about the need to hire Poles to serve Poles in German banks.  Another asks 
respondents’ opinion about a number of German banks.  Answers to the questions in this group could be 
used by German bankers to adapt their operations to the demands of  Polish customers. A final question 
asks Poles actively banking in Germany what services and products they use. 
Polish respondents left no doubt that the German bank managers should hire Polish people, have staff speak 
Polish, and translate document into Polish.  Ninety-two percent said it was important or rather important for 
Görlitz banks to hire Poles, between 89-94 percent, depending on the question, that the German banks 
needed to give legal advice, sell insurance, and offer notary services in Polish.  Eight-two percent wanted 
IT services to be in Polish.  They were just as insistent, if not more, about the need to translate written 
materials.  Seventy-four percent thought it important that advertisements “always” be translated, 84 percent  
  29 
that “information brochures” “always” be translated, 88 percent that “product specifications” be “always” 
translated, 98 percent that “legal document and contracts” “always” be translated, and 91 percent that 
transactions forms “always” be translated. 
The Poles also expected to get better service in German banks than in Polish.  Thirty-seven percent of  
respondents said the service would be better, 8 percent worse than in Poland, and 23 percent that it would 
be the same; the numbers for “more courteous” service in Germany were 40 percent, 7 percent less 
courteous, 18 percent the same; those for “better informed employees, 38 percent better, 7 percent worse 
informed than in Poland, 20 percent the same; 15 percent better informed managers, 1 percent worse 
informed, 31 percent the same; 23 percent better e-banking in Germany, 4 percent worse, and 26 percent 
the same; 33 percent better ATM Services, 3 percent worse, 29 percent, the same, and 28 percent better 
International ATM networks available in Germany, 3 percent worse, and 14 percent the same.  The results 
speak as much about poor regional banking in Poland as about Germany; they offer an incentive for 
German bank managers to entice clients from Poland. 
The conclusion about poor Polish service is reinforced by Polish answers to a question about why they 
wished to open accounts in German banks. German bankers should note the high Polish demand to bank in 
Germany, for of Polish respondents 80 percent said it was important or rather important to have a Giro 
Account in a German bank, 7 percent not;  for 76 percent it was important to have a business account,  for 6 
percent, not; 58 percent said that it would improve his/her firm’s image to have an account in a German 
bank,  9 percent not; 86 percent that they wanted an account in a German bank to have access to credit 
cards (as credit cards in Poland are sold under Visa and MasterCard marquee without international 
recognition), 2 percent did not; 86 percent that it was important or rather important to have an account to 
get personal loans,7 percent did not; 63 percent that it was important or rather important to have an account 
to get business loans, 6 percent did not; 74 percent said that an important or rather important reason was to 
get lower bank fees,6 percent not; 90 percent said that an important or rather important to open German 
account was to get a mortgage,1 percent did not. 
 After asking Poles what they expect in products and services in Germany, the next question asked what 
products and services those banking there (Poles and Germans) actually use. Of the 90 Poles in the 
respondent pool, fifty-four percent answered; it is assumed that they bank in Göerlitz.   Of the 90 Germans 
between 76 and 79 answered, depending on product or service, the same question.  The Polish and 
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Table 9: Relative Importance of Retail Financial Products & Services to Poles and Germans, 2005 
(Sorted in order of importance for Germans. Percent of total responses. Missing values excluded.) 
Product or Service  Poles  Germans  Product or Service  Poles  Germans 
Giro Account  16%  100%  Business Planning  13%  28% 
ATM  29%  95%  Share Dealing  15%  28% 




10%  68%  Bank deposit/guarantee  10%  13% 
Credit Card  29%  73%  Forward Exchange Rate  10%  13% 
Currency Exchange  21%  65%  Letter of Credit  8%  9% 
EC Card Terminal 
PoS or PoZ 
17%  47%  Fixed rate deposits  17%  16% 
Investment Funds  15%  43%  Company Liability 
Insurance 
13%  11% 
Cross Border 
Payments 
13%  39%  Business Credit Card  29%  26% 
Business Loans  15%  39%  Interest rate forward  15%  8% 
International 
Contacts 
10%  32%  Lawyer/Legal Insurance  21%  12% 
Personal Loans  25%  46% 
     
 
Obviously fewer Poles actually use these services and products than German respondents.  Moreover, there 
is a big disparity between the services Poles say they seek in German banks and the ones they actually use.  
The participation rate could be low for the Poles because they are only taking part of their business to 
Germany.  Only one product/service is ranked the same for Poles and Germans (i.e. Letter of Credit, eight 
and nine percent respectively). Five products/services, all clearly within the remit of international banking 
practice, Poles ranked higher than Germans (Fixed rate deposits, Company liability insurance, Business 
credit card, Interest rate forward and Legal insurance). This suggests that Poles are willing to cross the 
border to secure products/services for their business dealings in Germany more than for personal reasons. 
The low ranking by Poles makes even more sense  considering that 47 percent of the Poles preferred one 
contact over several specialists in a retail bank.  At present there is no-one for them to contact at the 
Dresdner Bank. The Germans will be able to exploit their Polish customer potential only by ending the 
deficiency in German banks’ knowledge of the  Polish language by hiring at least one Polish speaking 
person to the customer-facing staff.  
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7.3 National Stereotypes 
 
Another group of questions covers national stereotypes.  They ask the respondent, using a list on which 
certain attributes are named (open—reserved, modern----traditional, courteous---discourteous, etc.), to 
make judgements about peoples’ national traits on a scale that runs from important to rather important to 
indifferent to rather unimportant to important.  One set of questions, listing attributes, asks the Polish 
respondents what he/she thinks Germans think of Poles.  Another, listing the same attributes, asked the 
Polish respondent what he/she actually do think of Poles.  Another question, also using the same list, asks 
Germans respondents what they think Poles think of Germans.   A final question-set asks the German 
respondent what he/she think of Poles.  The distinction drawn here is important because it could well be 
what Germans think about Poles and Poles about Germans is quite different from what Poles think 
Germans think about them or from what Germans think Poles think about them.  To know this difference 
could help German bank managers develop policies that foster cross-border banking.   
For the results offered in Table 10 we have collapsed “rather important” and “important” into one category. 
And we also include the percentage of “indifferent” responses, meaning that the respondents were not 
much interested in the question.  The "indifferent" answers about stereotypes are particularly significant to 
the results, especially for the Germans.  Of the ninety who filled out the questionnaire only 70-75, 
depending on the attribute on the list, bothered to check an answer.  Forty-one percent of the Germans, 
moreover, answered "indifferent". The number of Polish respondents was greater (in the 80th percentile) but 
the "indifferent" response rate for the Poles of 27 percent was also high.  Together 34 percent of all 
respondents to the question about stereotypes checked “indifferent”. Anecdotal evidence shows that 
respondents were uneasy if not upset about the topic.  They found it “insulting” to comment about whether 
neighboring peoples were intelligent, lazy, arrogant, etc.  But those who answered provide some useful 
results. See Table 10. 
Table 10: Preconceptions of National Characteristics by Poles and Germans, 2005 
(Percentage of those respondents who checked the trait. “Indifferent” in parenthesis) 
 
                                                                                   Germans    Poles on German   Poles on  .    Germans on 
                                                                                    on Poles   View of Poles        Germans       Poles View   
                                                                                                                                                          of Germans 
 
Open                                                                              61 (26)          67 (17)           29 (18)        17 (26) 
Reserved                                                                       13                   16                   53                58 
Modern                                                                            54 (27)            45 (21)        38 (13)        34 (19)    
Traditional                                                                       21                    34               49                47 
 
Courteous                                                                         57 (31)            45 (21)        24 (31)       40 (23) 
Discourteous                                                                     11                   34               36               37 
 
Cheerful                                                                             45(27)             37 (28)      32(19)        16(21) 
Serious                                                                              28                     35             49               62   
  32 
 
Communicative                                                                 53 (32)            54 (30)      38 (29)        41 (25) 
Uncommunicative                                                              14                   16             33               34 
 
Interested in Culture                                                            59(23)           30(25)       61(21)       59(22)              
Not Interested in Culture                                                     18                  45             18              19  
 
Generous                                                                               36(49)          33(34)      19(40)        17(32) 
Pedantic                                                                                14             33             41              51  
 
Dreamy                                                                                  21 (47)         44 (16)             17 (26)         20 (18) 
Realistic                                                                                 32                 21                    63                 62 
 
Reliable                                                                                  23 (49)         32 (25)            54 (22)         45 (24)  
Unreliable                                                                               27                43                    24                 31 
 
Hardworking                                                                            42(49)        40(16)             54(21)          50(25) 
Lazy                                                                                          9                44                    24                 25  
 
Honest                                                                                      24(60)       36(33)              33(34)         28(44) 
Dishonest                                                                                 16          31                     33               28  
 
Inspiring Confidence                                                                24 (46)      28 (34)            35 (31)          26 (53) 
Not Inspiring Confidence                                                         30              38                    34                 21 
 
Helpful                                                                                       61(27)      42(24)              33(22)          32(30) 
Not Helpful                                                                               12             34                      45               38  
 
Family Oriented                                                                         63 (23)     58 (22)              44 (25)    45 (18) 
Career Oriented                                                                          14            20                      31               37 
 
Skilled                                                                                       36 (53)     37 (17)            38(28)     40(27)   
Unskilled                                                                                   11         36             34            33  
 
Satisfied                                                                                       39 (37)    27 (23)         40 (22)           36 (26)  
Unsatisfied                                                                                   28           50                 38                   40 
 
Arrogant                                                                                       14 (48)   38(33)          45 (38)           45 (42) 
Not Arrogant                                                                                38           29                17                   13 
 
Credulous                                                                                    17 (52)     43 (27)       22 (36)            27 (24) 
Suspicious                                                                                   31             30              42                    49 
 
Efficient                                                                                        17 (66)    46 (19)      22 (36)            51 (18) 
Inefficient                                                                                     17            35             28                    31 
 
Intelligent                                                                                     50 (46)    33 (33)     44 (36)             42 (34) 
Not Intelligent                                                                                4            34            20                     24 
 
Xenophobic                                                                                  20 (47)   17 (35)     43 (31)              48 (33) 
Not Xenophobic                                                                           33          48             26                      1 
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7.3  Discussion 
The fact that the number of “indifferent” is so great is probably a healthy sign because it could mean that 
stereotype judgments no longer hinder intercourse between peoples.  People are no longer interested in 
stereotyping.  But there are stereotype answers which, for German bankers, should give cause for worry.  
The disparity between what Polish and German respondents  thought of each other is one answer source 
(first and third columns).  The fact that Poles have a more negative view of Germans than Germans do of 
Poles in many of the answers should prompt German managers, seeking business, to try to correct.  They 
could invoke policies to convince Poles that Germans, as Poles believe, are not arrogant, are not 
xenophobic, are helpful.  This effort might be especially successful because the evidence shows (first and 
second column) what Germans actually think of Poles is much more favorable than what Poles think 
Germans think of them (Not interested in Culture, Pedantic, Lazy, Not Helpful, Unskilled, Credulous, 
Arrogant, and Efficient). 
  
8  Summary and Conclusions  
We began by stressing how important the economy is to the fate of a bank’s management.  The two 
examples used, AIB and Hypo Vereinsbank, existed in very different economies with management in them  
operating under quite different constraints.  AIB management could survive malfeasance in the 
management of it subsidiary, and the heavy loses it induced, because of a boisterous Irish economy.  Hypo 
Vereinsbank’s management lived a more precarious existence because of a poor German economy.  And so 
did other banks in Germany.  The evidence from the interviews and the questionnaires suggests that the 
economic factor probably effected the judgment of Poles and Germans in the Neisse region about co-
determination.  The American claim that co-determination was inefficient management might not have 
been true but Germans in this border region, in the economic situation in which they found themselves after 
unification, could not afford to run the risk of suffering the consequences if it were.  It would be better in 
this economy not to chance increasing inefficiency by letting employees participate in management.  So 
German and Polish respondents to the questionnaire mostly rejected co-determination for the top-down 
management model with which they in any event were familiar under Communism.  Moreover, in this 
region of Germany, the supporters of co-determination were particularly weak.  Trade unions in large firms 
that had been the backbone of the co-determination movement in West Germany had very little influence in 
this de-industrialized borderland area.  Their opinion would not have been much represented in the pool of 
those questioned.  
The respondents to the questionnaire approached the second aspect of the Rhineland model, the “kingly 
merchant tradition” differently.  For investment bankers and their clients in the big financial centers, no 
doubt Anglo-American capitalism posed a big challenge to Hausbank finance.  But the Zgorzelec-Görlitz 
respondents were interested in retail banking, and the kingly merchant tradition in this regard presented a  
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much less visible and indeed not as great a challenge to the Rhineland model.  Germans could make trust 
and loyalty a major factor in their decisions about banks in their town, as could people in small-town 
America.  Since most Polish banks were in foreign hands, the Poles seemed much more willing to move 
from bank to bank, making their decisions on interest rates, fees, and product availability.  Germans in 
Görlitz stayed with German banks and overwhelmingly with the local savings bank (Sparkasse).  But 
Germans answering the questionnaire also wanted their banks to give better and cheaper service, although 
they disliked American style hard-sell product and service marketing.  Whether they can have both or it is 
just a matter of time before banking based on persuasion and consumerism become the norm, probably 
depends more on the general economic recovery of central Europe than anything else.   If the economy 
goes wrong, the trade-off – the abandonment of the social harmony structured into the Rhineland model – 
would be great, since the hundred years of effort it took to create it would go down the drain.   
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